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ABSTRACT: 
Today, preservation conflicts often no longer deal with the question whether nature needs to 
be preserved, but with how one needs to go about preserving it. In this new type of conflict, 
preservationists see themselves pitted against local inhabitants who contest the preservation 
goals for a given area. In such instances, preservationists tend to defend their position by 
withdrawing into a technical discourse about biodiversity preservation. By presenting the case 
of heathland restoration in the Low Countries, we want to examine how preservationists might 
reformulate their position so as to highlight the moral concern at the heart of their practice. In 
order to do so, we will use a broadly hermeneutical approach to ethics which focusses on 
stories and narratives as expressions of moral self-understanding in need of interpretation and 
elaboration. As such, our paper is an example of what a Rolstonian ‘ethics of storied 
residence’ might look like in practice.  
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According to Holmes Rolston, and adequate environmental ethic should focus both on what he calls 
the nomothetic (or recurrent) and the ideographic (or uniquely particular) (Rolston, 1988: 342). It is 
the duty of the person to bind these two together in a ”personal storied residence in the environment”:  
 
residence in a local environment senses the recurrent universals particularly displayed in that 
place – the seasons, the regenerative, vital powers of life, the life support, the proportions of 
time and place. It enjoys these big assurances exemplified in local areas. A human in his 
biography […] is a detection device for catching something of that richness and integrity of 
what is taking place on that landscape (346-347) 
 
An ethic of storied residence should according to Rolston not simply see a particular place as 
representation of certain universals. We do not value the Grand Canyon because it is a particularly 
good representation of the universal type ”canyonland,” but rather: ”because it is the particular place it 
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is, one of a kind, warranting a proper name” (342).1 Particular places present us with unique 
trajectories in which ecological universals, through the process of evolution, combine in ever new, 
unexpected and largely unpredictable ways to form locally unique environments, landscapes and 
places. Particular places thus present us with a unique history which is the basis of their individuality, 
which in turn is the basis for our valuation. Yet humans graft their stories on the land too by dwelling 
or residing in it. This residence, according to Rolston, must be understood as an interpretative act. 
Residing in a place entails telling the (hi)story of the landscape and that: ”telling of the story might 
make the human part in it seem right, fitting, appropriate behavior. Taking a narrative role might make 
the story, and the human part in it, seem meaningful” (345).  
As Rolston stresses, the telling of the story is an act of interpretation: ”[landscapes are] like the 
books in our cultural libraries […] to be read, palimpsests of the past (343).” The philosophical 
tradition in which the act of interpretation as part of the quest for meaning takes center stage, is of 
course the hermeneutical tradition. As John van Buren (2014)2 has remarked, Rolston’s account of 
environmental ethics as ”storied residence” in particular environments therefore opens up an 
opportunity to construct a hermeneutical approach to environmental ethics.3 Such a hermeneutical 
environmental ethic focusses on the meanings persons perceive in their environments, whereby the 
”perception of meaning” is seen as an act of interpretation of the environment. For Paul Ricoeur, as 
apparently is the case for Rolston, such interpretation is however always also self-interpretation; it 
allows us to understand ourselves and our position in the world differently, and hopefully also more 
appropriately and thoroughly (Ricoeur, 1981, also see Drenthen, 2011). 
Van Buren (2014) correctly notes that such a hermeneutical approach is both interpretative and 
narrative. Interpretative, because it focusses on environments as sources of meaning that need to be 
appropriated, and narrative, because such appropriations usually take on the form of narrations or 
stories: ”since it usually entails views of the past, present, and future, and these function like the 
beginning, middle, and end in the unified plot of a narrative, as defined classically by Aristotle.” (18) 
It is through the story that the Self can take up a position in a larger context of which he understands 
himself a part. As Rolston correctly claims, the story enables one to derive both meaning and direction 
                                                          
1
 It is illuminating to compare what Rolston says about valuing natural areas as a particulars with what O'Neill 
et.al. have said about valuing natural areas as spatio-temporal particulars, especially in chapter 8 and throughout 
the third part of Environmental Values (2008).  
2
 An earlier version of this paper was published already in 1995. Van Buren, John. 1995. Critical environmental 
hermeneutics. Environmental Ethics, 17: 259-275.  
3
 We do not wish to suggest that the philosophy and ethics of Holmes Rolston in general could be understood as 
somehow crypto-hermeneutical. Indeed, there would be great problems in interpreting Rolston in this way, not 
in the least because of his insistence upon the existence of objective moral value (inherent value). We do 
however suggest that one way of understanding what Rolston in his characteristically evocative style has dubbed 
”storied residence” can be to treat it as an opening to a hermeneutical approach to the environment. 
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for one's life, allowing one to make sense of both one's life and the environment in which it unfolds. 
Crucially, because one understands oneself by placing oneself within the narrative of the story,  the 
story allows one to see certain acts as ”right, fitting and appropriate”, namely when acts accord with 
the place and role one sees oneself taking up in the story. The story and its entailing self-understanding 
is thus normatively charged: the self-understanding it brings is a moral self-understanding. 
The environmental hermeneuticist will be, as it were, ‘naturally drawn’ to conflicts about the 
meaning of places, because it is there that the full effect can be seen of how different interpretations of 
the landscape give rise to different understandings of place and self; and how this results in differing 
views about what actions count as appropriate. As Ricoeur holds, hermeneutics is a way of learning 
how to deal with such conflicts of interpretations (Ricoeur, 1974). Confronted with them, the 
hermeneutics however does not just take note of the different interpretations in a debate, but it also 
attempts to stage a conversation between these interpretations, in search of a fusion of horizons where 
different readers might find a common understanding of a ‘text’ (Gadamer, 1975).   
Consequently, environmental hermeneutics can play both a critical and a constructive role. It can 
be critical in the sense that a reflection on our understanding of nature can make one more aware of the 
contingent character of one’s particular understanding of nature, and open oneself up to alternative 
understandings. The other might be right, to use Gadamer’s words. It can be constructive by 
suggesting new articulations and interpretations that seem to voice the moral experiences that underlie 
any of our relations with the natural world more adequately  . 
 
In an attempt to put environmental hermeneutics, and thus Rolston’s views about storied residence, 
into practice, we have therefore chosen one ’new‘ type of environmental conflict, a type that reoccurs 
regularly at least in the Low Countries, as an example: the conflict over heath restoration-schemes. We 
are fully aware that our analysis of this particular conflict has little that can be generalized, although 
similar conflicts seem to have taken place in other parts of the globe.4 A concrete application of the 
hermeneutical method cannot yield but culturally specific meanings, as it whole point is to reflect on 
how particular individuals or groups understand their place in the world.5  
What is however generalizable, and, we believe, of both relative novelty and importance to the 
environmental debate, is using the hermeneutical method of describing these conflicts.6 In short, in 
                                                          
4
 See, for instance Gobster, P., Hull, B. (eds.). 2000. Restoring Nature. Perspectives from the Social Sciences 
and Humanities. Washington: Island Press  
5
 It however needs to be said that of course nothing precludes that a hermeneutical approach will yield meanings 
that are more universally shared. Compare also O'Neill et.al. (2008): 121-124 
6
 For an extensive introduction into environmental hermeneutics, its history and its role within and for 
environmental ethics and philosophy, see Interpreting Nature. The Emerging Field of Environmental 
Hermeneutics. Edited by Forrest Clingerman, Brian Treanor, Martin Drenthen, and David Utsler. New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2014. 
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analyzing the conflicts over heath restoration, we will focus on the stories that those involved in those 
conflicts tell themselves about both the particular places and their relations to them, and treat those as 
accounts of how they interpretatively understand their proper place and role within the environment. 
As will become clear, such stories are, in accordance with van Buren’s remarks on environmental 
hermeneutics, all about situating oneself in a narrative context with a past, present and future. In 
accordance with Rolston’s vision of a storied residence, they deal with how we take up residence in a 
particular environment—which has both a non-human and human history—by reading ourselves in to 
it (Drenthen, 2011). By focusing on these stories, we will ‘draw out’, so to speak, the underlying moral 
narratives of these conflicts and, while the particular content of those stories might not be 
generalizable, we believe that the method thus employed is of great relevance of dealing with (moral) 
environmental conflicts in general.7  
In the next section, we will first say something about the relative novelty of the particular type of 
conflict we wish to discuss before we will start delving into the particular stories themselves. 
 
CONFLICTING VIEWS ON BRINGING BACK THE HEATH  
 
Increasingly, preservation organizations seem to be fighting a double battle. Traditionally, 
preservationists campaigned quite simply for the preservation of nature. They firmly believed 
themselves to be on the side of nature, protecting it against a greedy and wasteful human economy 
hungry to convert all of it into industrial parks, transport infrastructure, housing and the like. Quite 
recently however, the tide has begun to change. In new types of conflict, preservation organizations 
are challenged precisely in the idea that they stand on the side of nature. Facing protesters, usually 
local inhabitants who disagree with the preservation goals set for a particular natural area, they stand 
accused of precisely that what they believed to be fighting against: the destruction of nature.  
What has happened? How come nature preservation organizations now, at least in some cases, 
have to defend themselves against the accusation of nature-vandalism? Of course, one has to 
understand that often, and especially in Europe, nature preservation isn’t simply about putting fences 
around a natural area in order to let nature further develop on its own accord. Many natural areas are 
‘humanly mediated’, in the sense that they have been thoroughly rearranged by (past) human activities 
that have fundamentally (re)shaped the ecology of those areas. Such human influence is not 
necessarily bad or destructive; many of the landscapes and habitats one wishes to protect for their 
beauty or species richness are precisely areas that have come about through the delicate interplay of 
human activity and ecological process. Heathlands are a case in point. Having become very rare over 
the last century, heathlands were once a central component of farming on poor, often sandy soils 
throughout Atlantic Europe. A heathland needs constant human interference in order to sustain itself: 
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 Compare on this point also O'Neill et.al. (2008): 121-124 
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without mowing, grazing, sod-cutting or burning, heathlands disappear. Because the heath lost its role 
in farming, the activities that sustained the heath for centuries were abandoned and heathlands started 
to disappear at an alarming rate, which entailed the loss of many species that depended on the heath 
for their survival. For that reason, heathlands are highly prized in preservation circles and many 
preservation campaigns aim at protecting or indeed restoring heathlands were possible. 
It is especially in that last instance, when heathlands are being actively restored, that 
preservationists8 are often confronted with protests, typically from local inhabitants. Of course, if one 
wants to restore heathland, one has to destroy the type of nature that is present in the area. A heath is 
an open, almost treeless landscape; its characteristic fauna and flora abhor the shade. Yet many former 
heathlands were planted early to mid-20th century with mostly pines to service the oncoming mining-
industry, which of course led to the disappearance of most of the sun-loving heathland species. In 
order to restore a heath, one needs to cut back the forest, to let sun reach the soil again, allowing 
heathland flora to resurface. And, as is almost always the case, the fauna will follow the flora.  
                                                          
8
 To some readers, especially those familiar with the North-American tradition of environmental philosophy, it 
might be surprising and confusing that we use the term ‘preservationists’ to describe organizations that are in 
favor of restoration. Indeed, in the North-American debate, the terms ‘preservationists’ and ‘restorationists’ are 
used to describe quite different groups with quite different approaches to environmental matters, often clashing 
over the question whether nature restoration is permissible or not. Many preservationist place prime value on the 
‘wildness’ of a natural area, in the sense that they value the fact that certain natural areas are relatively free from 
the imprint of human activities. Subsequently they favor a ‘hands off’ approach to nature conservation and tend 
to reject all forms of restoration, even when ecologically informed, because after restoration a natural area of 
course cannot be said to be free of human imprint (see, for instance, Elliot 1982). However, when we use the 
term ‘preservationist’, we do so in a loose and non-technical manner, describing those people who are organized 
in what in the Low Countries are generally recognized as the nature-preservation organizations 
[natuurbehoudsverenigingen], as opposed to the protester which are members of the general public and are not 
necessarily organized in any officially recognized organization. Moreover, drawing sharp distinctions between 
restorationists and preservationists does not make much sense in a European context. Almost all European 
nature is of course ‘humanly mediated nature’, in the sense that what are deemed ‘natural’ landscapes and 
ecosystems in Europe are always (at least partly) shaped by the activities of humans, and thus depend on the 
continuation of those activities in order to be preserved. Heaths are of course a case in point, as we explain 
further on in this paper. When one wants to ‘preserve’ a heath, one for instance needs to keep on mowing or 
burning it. While in Europe such practices would be considered as 'preservation', such activities would in a 
North-American context probably be catalogued under eco-cultural restoration (see for instance Higgs, 2003). 
Because of those differences in ecological context and in sensibilities surrounding what constitutes 
preservationist practice and because we use the term in a non-technical way as described above, we feel justified 
in describing those in favor of heath restoration as ‘preservationists’. See also O’Neill et.al. (2008) for the subtle 
varieties in perception of what counts as ‘nature’ in the Old versus the New World and the subsequent different 
evaluation of preservation practices and sensibilities.  
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It is precisely this clearing of the forest that usually sparks the most vehement of protests, 
especially when it concerns several hectares in a relative short space of time, which is often the most 
efficient way of working. In recent years, at least two of such protests have reached the national press 
in the Low Countries, next to numerous protests that have had a more local impact. In The 
Netherlands, a scheme called ‘Heiderijk’, connecting the last remaining pieces of heathland in a 
(re)forested area in the east of the country, along the German border, between the communities of 
Groesbeek, Malden and Nijmegen by cutting several dozen hectares of forest, has been met by fierce 
protests of local inhabitants. The same has happened in the north-east of Belgium, where about a 
hundred hectares of forest needed to be cut down in the forests surrounding the monastery of 
Averbode in order to give heathlands a new chance. 
Remarkably, the protests on both sides of the Dutch/Belgian border are quite similar, as they are 
similar in almost all of these cases throughout the Low Countries.9 Both groups of protesters are 
baffled by the fact that the preservation organizations in charge are turning the forests, which the 
locals all identify as ‘their own neighborhood forest’, into ‘lunar landscapes’ of tree trunks and 
caterpillar tracks. They invariably accuse the preservation organizations of choosing for heathland-
restoration out of self-interest. According to them, the choice for heath has nothing to do with nature 
at all: heathlands need to be constantly managed in order to be preserved; in restoring heathland, those 
organizations thus assure themselves of future work. Moreover, such organizations can get more 
subsidies for the maintenance of heaths than for the maintenance of the forests they replace. Why 
should one go back to heathland anyway? The heath is a historical landscape, why would a historical 
landscape be more valuable than the forest it replaces? Is the choice for heath rather than forest not 
purely arbitrary? On the basis of what criteria can such a choice be made anyway? Shouldn’t one 
rather let nature be instead of trying to create a kind of historical surrogate-nature through highly 
artificial means? Isn’t heathland the result of over-exploitation by humans in the past anyway? The 
forests we always enjoyed walking through have been shattered: who wants to walk in the blazing sun 
surrounded by dried up grass? Is all of this necessary for those few grasshoppers, bees and snakes one 
wishes to save? What about the forest animals, don’t they count? No, nature is clearly not on those 
preservationists’ minds: they are surely paid by the contractors that cut down the forest; they’re only 
interested in cleaning up the balance sheet of their organizations through selling wood. 
From their side, the preservationists point to ecological values in order to defend themselves: those 
forests are relatively young and the ecological value of forests increases with age. It is almost only in 
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 We base our account of the discourse of both the protesters and the preservation organizations on an analysis 
of texts found on four representative websites dedicated to the cases at hand: two for the protesters and two for 
the preservationist, distributed evenly over both countries. For the organizations who protest the removal of the 
forest we selected http://groenebomen.wordpress.com for Belgium and http://redonsbos.nl for The Netherlands; 
for the preservationists, we selected http://www.heiderijk.nl and http://www.averbodebosenheide.be for 
Belgium. 
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old-growth that you will find typical and valuable woodland species, such as the Wood Anemone, 
Wild Arum, Wood Garlic and the Black Woodpecker. One can hardly call those forests natural 
anyway, in fact, they are tree-plantations: they were planted with the specific goal of providing the 
mining-industry with poles for the construction of shafts after the heath had lost its pivotal role in 
farming. Because those forests were designed as tree-plantations, the trees have been planted so close 
together that little light can penetrate to the forest floor, leaving little opportunity for forest-floor 
species to grow. If you make the forests more open, other species will get a chance to colonize the 
area, especially heathland species. Those heathland species have suffered greatly from the 
disappearance of the heath, many of them have become very rare or are endangered; we must give 
them new opportunities by increasing the area of heathland habitat. This is also the priority for the 
European Union: they have decided that where possible, we need to promote heathland species. In any 
case, we’re not planning on cutting every tree, a big part of the forest will remain in place, and studies 
show that people tend to enjoy the mixture of closed and open landscapes we are trying to achieve 
through our restoration efforts. Wait and see: it might not look very attractive at the moment, but in a 
couple of years this barren stretch of sand will be a purple sea of heather teeming with life.  
In these cases, preservationists run up against the protests of concerned local inhabitants which 
contest the claim that the preservationists know what is best for nature, or even that preservationists 
are actually concerned with nature in the first place. Of course, these type of conflicts not only arise in 
the case of heathland restoration, but also when for instance measures are taken to remove (weedy) 
exotic species, or generally whenever drastic measures are deemed to be necessary to develop a type 
of habitat quite distant from the one actually present.  
We believe that these conflicts have more than just a local import. They reveal something 
fundamental about the way in which moral conflicts are being dealt with in present preservationists’ 
controversies. Indeed, we believe that part of the escalation of such conflicts is the result of those 
conflicts not being articulated enough, or more saliently, not being articulated in the right way. While 
overtly such conflicts are usually fought out on empirical grounds with the conflicting groups 
contesting each other’s expertise in a certain domain (heathland species/true forest species will never 
grow here, they don’t know what they’re doing!) the smoldering and often underdeveloped moral 
issue under many of these conflicts is one about the meaning of place and how we, both as humans in 
general and inhabitants of a local area, need to relate to nature and to very specific places.  
   
UNKNOWN, THEREFORE UNLOVED 
 
In the preservationist discourse, the main stress is on the importance of the diversity, rareness and 
richness of species. This stress on species should come as no surprise. The diversity of species is an 
important aspect of the concept of ‘biodiversity’. According to a widely used, general definition of the 
8 
 
term, biodiversity is the diversity of genes, species and ecosystems present on earth.10 The term 
‘biodiversity’ itself was invented in the mid-nineteen eighties by a select group of mainly North-
American biologists, who named themselves ‘conservation biologists’ in order to give voice to the 
enormous variability and complexity of life on earth, and, maybe more importantly, to the deleterious 
effects we were having on this variety and complexity of life (Takacs 1996). Most of them had 
experience working as ecologists in field stations across the tropical America, where they were 
confronted first hand with the devastating effects human encroachment was having on the variability 
of nature. Having been privileged witnesses of this large scale devastation, these biologists felt a 
unique responsibility in addressing these issues publically. The term biodiversity was therefore 
consciously launched by the conservation in an attempt to raise both political and public awareness 
about the loss of biological variety. 
Today, one can of course hardly imagine any debate on nature preservation without ‘biodiversity’ 
being mentioned, even to the extent that nature preservation is often simply equated to the 
preservation of biodiversity (McKloskey 2008). In this respect, the concept has been very successful 
in achieving the goal for which it was launched: the loss of biodiversity is seen as priority number one 
by both environmental policy (from the local all the way up to the global level) and by preservation 
organizations. A not altogether unintended side-effect on this stress on the importance of biodiversity 
is the fact that conservation biology has propelled itself into a central position of authority within the 
preservation discourse (Takacs 1996). Indeed, conservation biologists are the central experts in 
biodiversity: not only did they coin the term; it is also their main area of research. If nature 
preservation is thus to be about the preservation of biodiversity, conservation biologists are the central 
experts in the field of preservation.   
Yet, in other respects the concept of biodiversity seems to be failing. Being a scientific, abstract 
term, it is not readily apparent why one should value ‘biodiversity’ as such. Indeed, while one might 
be easily convinced by the need to preserve appealing ‘flagship species’, the most famous of all being 
the panda, it is not clear why one should value all of those other unknown, less appealing and 
sometimes even downright repelling species that make up the vast majority of life within ecosystems.   
Indeed, one of the reasons that it is relevant to know that the concept of biodiversity was launched 
by biologists working in tropical America, is precisely the fact that the neotropics lack the kind of 
‘charismatic megafauna’ other regions do have to serve as flagship species (Oksanen 2004). While the 
East has its pandas, tigers and orangutans, Africa its gorillas, rhinos and elephants, tropical America 
seems to be lacking in clear candidates to act as mascots for preservation efforts. That is one of the 
reasons why the concept of biodiversity was used: in order not to depend on the presence of one 
appealing species, one stressed both the threat to and the value of the totality of life and its complex, 
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 See for instance UNEP. 2013. What is Biodiversity. http://www.unep-wcmc.org/what-is-biodiversity_50.html 
(accessed 29 August 2013) 
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interacting structures. It was then argued that it was precisely in the interaction that the value of those 
lesser appealing species lies: life is structured as a complex web of interactions, and if you take one 
node out of the web, however humble that node might seem, this will create knock-on effects, leaving 
a much bigger whole than could have been guessed. 
The problem is however that this is a very dangerous argument.11 If one argues for the preservation 
of a given species on the basis that its disappearance will lead to the disappearance of a whole number 
of other species, because they were all constitutive of and dependent on the same functional whole, 
one only has to doubt whether the existence of that particular species is indeed so crucial to the 
presence of others in order for the argument to lose all of its force. More often than not, it is indeed 
quite unclear what the functional role of a species is. There are numerous examples of species that 
were considered to have an important functional role within ecosystems but have died out without any 
radical changes happening to the ecosystems of which they were a part. In such instances, the only 
option that seems to be open to preservationists is point to the ‘intrinsic value’ of species. Yet pointing 
to the ‘intrinsic value’ of species is often treated with distrust: aren’t the preservationists hiding their 
own highly subjective preferences for particular species and particular forms of nature preservation 
under the cloak of morality?  
 
PAYING LIP SERVICE TO PARTICIPATION 
 
As Keulartz et al. (2004) correctly note, up to the mid-nineties the European Union believed nature-
policy should be a top-down affair on the basis of: “the assumption that it is up to scientific experts 
and not to ordinary citizens and politicians to determine the direction of nature policy” (83).12 
Ecological knowledge was seen as the starting-point of nature-policy. Areas that were to fall under the 
NATURA-2000 network for instance, a network of preservation areas with the highest preservation 
priority crisscrossing the European Union, were selected on the basis of ecological criteria alone, such 
as their biodiversity value. Yet when it came down to implementing the NATURA-2000 network 
locally, it quickly became clear that ecological values often clashed with the interest of local 
inhabitants, leading to numerous conflicts that bogged down the implementation of policy.13 
Therefore, the European Union opted to change the top-down approach for more interactive and 
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 Compare Sahotra Sarkar. 2005. Biodiversity and Environmental Philosophy. An Introduction. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
12
 Compare also with; Julien (1998). Natura 2000: The Ecological Network of the European Union, European 
Nature. Magazine on the Interface of Policy and Science(1): 12. 
13
 For an analysis of these types of conflict in France, see Alphandéry, P. and A. Fortier (2001). Can a Territorial 
Policy be Based on Science Alone? The System for Creating the Natura 2000 Network in France, Sociologica 
Ruralis (41): 311–28.  
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participatory forms of government, inviting all stakeholders to be part in the policy-making process 
from the start. 
European policy thus shifted away from an emphasis on purely ecological values to incorporate the 
many ways in which nature is of importance to local stakeholders. This shift away from ecological 
values has of course been met with some distrust by the preservationists community: would this shift 
not lead to a “dilution of preservation goals, in the sense that less hectares will be designated as nature 
areas, and that the type of nature to be realized will shift from deeper to lighter shades of green” (83)? 
In practice however, it is more often the case that the participatory element in nature-policy is mere 
window dressing: rather than attempt to include locals in the policy-making process itself, the 
‘interaction’ remains limited to informing the local public about the reasons why a certain 
preservation measure will be taken. The preservationist camp often seems unable to take seriously the 
idea that locals can have a relevant and valid opinion with respect to nature-policy and preservation 
measures. After all, the preservationists see themselves as the experts par excellence in matters of 
nature preservation. Surely they know what is best for nature.14 
This failure to take the input of local inhabitants seriously as a substantive contribution to the 
policy-making process is also present in the Low Countries. In reaction to complaints that nature 
policy had become “too technocratic” and “too dominated by ecological values” (Keulartz et.al. 
2004), the Dutch government stressed the need for taking into account the multiple ways in which 
nature mattered to people in order to create a broader public support for nature preservation. The 
problem however is that ‘the way nature matters to people’ was too easily equated with ‘the way 
people experience nature’. In order to maintain or create sufficient public support, it appeared that all 
that was needed was to keep on offering people a satisfying experience of nature, and thus to keep this 
experiential dimension in mind when planning preservation measures. 
But what if the experience of local inhabitants clash with the plans of the preservationists, such as 
is the case in the Heiderijk or Averbode? Of course, in such instances preservationists will keep on 
insisting on the priority of ecological values, i.e. biodiversity. Indeed, we should protect nature for 
nature’s sake, and we have all agreed (through international and national legislation) that biodiversity 
is what is important about nature. Whether a particular species is rare is an objective fact, whether or 
not a certain area can give one a pleasurable nature-experience only depends on subjective 
preferences. We cannot let something as trivial as personal tastes in nature experiences determine the 
preservation agenda. Moreover, we are already taken the experiences of people into account. Once the 
admittedly unpleasant phase of deforestation is behind us, the area will once again provide ample 
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 For the problem of the dominance of the scientific/cognitivistic approach within preservation practice, see 
Alphandéry and Fortier (2001) and Arjen Buijs. 2009. Public Natures. Social Representations of Nature and 
Local Practices, Wageningen: WUR Wageningen.  
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opportunity for agreeable nature experiences: studies show that people actually prefer the mix of more 
open land and forest we are actually trying to create. 
The question is whether the conflict that surfaces here can be brushed aside so easily. Is it really a 
conflict between ecologically illiterate local inhabitants who want to defend their subjective 
preferences against preservationists that use their expertise to defend and promote only the best 
interest of nature itself? It seems that by saying that the locals are only interested in a certain 
experience of nature doesn’t allow for an adequate articulation of the moral issues which lie at the 
heart of this conflict. When one looks at the viewpoint of the protesters, it appears that they want to 
defend their nature, not merely their experience of nature. When the preservationists thus want to 
appease the protesters by saying that the type of nature they will be developing will provide 
opportunities for as much, or even more opportunities for nature pleasant nature experiences, they 
miss the point that the engagement of those locals with their local reserve is a moral one. It is an 
engagement with a particular natural area out of the belief that this particular area is worth protecting.  
 
GOING BEYOND EXPERIENCES 
 
The problem is that by stressing the fact that it is all about the way in which one experiences nature, 
one reduces nature to the status of a simple means to have certain (pleasurable) experiences. A real 
moral approach to nature cannot however start from such an instrumentalist perspective. When we 
want to protect nature, we do not (only) do so because nature is in some way of use to us, but because 
nature is in some way of value to or meaning for us. Usually, one refers to the concept of ‘intrinsic 
value’ in order to describe the idea that nature is in itself valuable, yet the concept of intrinsic value 
seems to dissemble more than it reveals. It does not seem to be able to fully express what it is like to 
experience nature as valuable or meaningful: that nature has a sort of gravity, a sincerity, that it 
impresses and fascinates, appeals and touches, and that the desire to preserve nature is a reaction to 
feeling enthralled by her in such a way.  
In Burden of Dreams, the making off-documentary of Werner Herzog’s masterpiece Fitzcarraldo, 
Herzog describes his feelings for the jungle as following:   
 
[Klaus] Kinski always says [the jungle] is full of erotic elements. I don’t see it so much erotic; 
I see it more full of obscenity. It’s just, nature here is vile and base. I wouldn’t see anything 
erotic here. I see fornication and asphyxiation and choking and fighting for survival and 
growing and just rotting away. Of course there is a lot of misery, but it is the same misery that 
is all around us. The trees here are in misery and the birds are in misery; I don’t think they 
sing, they just screech in pain. […] It is a land which God, if he exists,  has created in anger, 
the only place were creation is unfinished yet. Taking a close look at what  surrounds us 
there is some sort of a harmony here. It is the harmony of overwhelming and collective 
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murder. And we in comparison to this articulate vileness and baseness and obscenity of all this 
jungle, we in comparison to that enormous articulation, we only sound and look like badly 
pronounced and half-finished sentences out of a stupid suburban novel, a cheap novel. And we 
have to become humble in front of this overwhelming misery, overwhelming fornication, 
overwhelming growth and overwhelming lack of order. Even the stars up here in the sky look 
like a mess. There is no harmony in  the universe, we have to get acquainted to this idea 
that there is no real harmony as we have conceived it. But when I say this I say this all full of 
admiration for the jungle. It is not that I hate it, I love it, I love it very much.  
 
Despite the fact that Herzog seems to find nothing but vileness and obscenity in the jungle, his 
statement is nevertheless one of deep appreciation for the jungle. Indeed, it is precisely in its obscenity 
that Herzog finds himself confronted with something bigger and more primary than himself, 
something to which he can only react with humbleness. Yet precisely because the recognition of the 
jungle is inextricably tied up to the vileness and baseness of the jungle, one cannot understand 
Herzog’s appreciation of the jungle in terms of a recognition of its ‘intrinsic value’ in any strict sense 
of the word, nor does he clearly value nature as a source of pleasant experiences. Despite the vileness 
and obscenity we owe nature respect according to Herzog, we should become humble in front of it and 
even try to love it. In all of its monstrosity it is indeed bigger than us: it overpowers us and points to 
our insignificance. That is precisely the reason while we are so enthralled by her: nature puts us in our 
place. Herzog’s statement about the jungle presents us with an extreme expression of what the 
recognition of nature as morally relevant is about: nature’s importance is tied up to the idea that she is 
external to us, seems to contain more truth than we do, and in some way is more real than the 
suburban triviality of our daily lives. It is because nature seems to present herself with a pretense to 
meaning in this way that we want to confront ourselves with her and protect her. 
All of this is denied in an approach that tries to express our relation to nature in terms of subjective 
experiences. Such an approach does not try to deal with what nature is, but how it is experienced. 
Nature can no longer function as a critical element in such a discourse: it is no longer that which is 
external to us, but is precisely totally consumed by our experience of it (Drenthen 2005). The fact that 
when we are interested in nature, when we value it or find it meaningful, we are not simply interested 
in experiences of nature was of course famously worked out by Robert Elliot in Faking Nature  
(1982). In a slightly different context, Elliot shows through a couple of thought experiments that a 
wilderness-enthusiast called John is not simply interested in experiences of the wild; these experience 
have to be experiences of the wild itself, because it is the wild itself that he values, not simply his 
experience of it: “John wants there to be wilderness and he wants to experience it. He wants the world 
to be a certain way and he wants experiences of a certain kind; veridical” (88). That he wants to 
experience wilderness at all, is but a function of the fact that he values wilderness, the “wilderness 
experience” he seeks thus loses all meaning if it isn’t an experience of the actual wild.  
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In the thought experiments, John falls, among other things, in the hands of a “utilitarian-minded 
supertechnologist” (88) who without John’s knowledge hooks him up to an experience machine which 
gives him the wilderness experience of a lifetime. In another example, he is taken, unknowingly, to a 
perfect plastic reproduction of a forest where again he has a great wilderness experience. In both 
instances Elliot however convincingly claims that if John were to know about the reality of his 
experiences, he would feel: “profoundly disappointed, perhaps even disgusted at what at best is a cruel 
joke” (89). 
If experiences were all that counts, we actually wouldn’t need nature at all: virtual reality could 
deliver experiences that are just as good, or, because of their accessibility and controllability, maybe 
even better than real experiences of nature. The point Elliot is getting at is that in our experience of 
nature, we want nature itself to be revealed, we want to get into contact with the reality of nature, a 
reality that exceeds our experience of it. It is only if we are convinced by the fact that in our 
experience something of the true reality of nature lights up that we will be satisfied in our experience. 
This entails, among others things, that when we are made too explicitly aware that we are being 
manipulated into having a particular kind of experience, the experience itself will lose most of its 
force. Indeed, once we feel we are being manipulated to have a certain experience, we can no longer 
believe that we are actually experiencing anything real.   
One can now better understand why the remark that the newly created natural area will also be a 
source of pleasurable experiences misses a crucial point and indeed won’t convince the locals to start 
supporting the plans. On the contrary: the more the preservation agencies will exert themselves to 
provide opportunities for such experiences –by placing bird hides, picnic tables, interpretative panels 
and mapping walks – the less the area is able to retain its power to enthrall us, precisely because the 
less one will be able to see it as a reality that surpasses our own. In our moral experience of nature, we 
want to be moved by nature itself. In order to be moved by nature itself, nature needs to be 
experienced as having a certain independence vis-à-vis us, as not made or controlled by us. 
This is what is at stake for the protesters in the Heiderijk case and at Averbode: they not only like 
those forests because they can walk there, but because they are fascinated by them. Those forests were 
never put there for their enjoyment or indeed, as far as they are concerned, for any other particular 
reason. Those forests are ‘just there’ to be discovered, and that is precisely what makes them so 
fascinating: the fact that they have a ‘thereness’, a reality of their own that can be explored, kept track 
off, studied, admired, that can surprise precisely because it is able to present itself in unexpected ways, 
rather than only through the preset interpretation of the preservation organization in charge of it. 
Nature can only appear as meaningful when it is a ‘given’, when it is not staged to impress. 
When the preservationist organizations are reproached for creating a “surrogate nature”, then the 
core of the problem seems to be that according to the protesters, the preservationists have a hard time 
accepting the ‘givenness’ of nature. Instead of accepting those forests as simply nature that is there, 
they want a nature that is made fully subservient to the plans and expectations of the preservationists: 
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to house the kinds of plants and animals that they, for whatever reason, like. Nature, as that which 
transcends the “all too human”, which is simply there as a given, is then precisely transformed to 
serve “all too human needs”. That is where the reproach that one is not really interested in nature itself 
comes from: the fact that the actions of the nature preservationists seem disrespectful of the givenness 
of nature. All preservation seems to have to start from the recognition, as Herzog does, that there is 
something bigger, pre-given out there that requires an attitude of humble respect. Of course, a local 
forest will not be so easily experienced, as in Herzog’s impression, as sublime moral depravity, but 
this does not do away with the basic insight that respect for nature entails respect for something which 
is pre-given, something which exceeds our experience of it.  
 
TECHNOCRATIC RESTORATIONS 
 
One can level the same sort of criticism at restoration attempts that focus on enhancing biodiversity 
and for that reason are prepared to intervene drastically into natural areas and processes. The 
enhancement of biodiversity as a justification for nature restoration is often presented as a pure 
technical matter: we are under the obligation by national and international law to preserve certain 
species and in order to preserve those, some managerial intervention in nature is needed.15 As such, 
nature once again is presented as a means to attain particular human goals, rather than as something 
that is pre-given and needs to be respected: nature preservation as a technical rather than a moral 
practice. The idea that what nature means to people can be reduced to the way in which it is 
experienced seamlessly fits into this story. The preservation organization presents itself as the 
specialist in determining what the ecological value of a particular natural area is and how to enhance it 
through technological means, while at the same time it is the specialist in determining what constitutes 
a leisurely experience of nature and how one should organize a natural area so that it affords such 
experiences. In both cases, nature itself as an entity in need of respect, seems to have vanished from 
view: nature can be manipulated to ensure the presence of species and to generate a certain pre-
determined experience.  
It is in this context that the Canadian environmental philosopher Eric Higgs gas pointed to the 
dangers of the ‘commodification of nature restorations’ (Higgs 2000, 2003). Higgs envisions two 
                                                          
15
 We do not want to suggest that a concern biodiversity necessarily leads to a technocratic approach to nature 
conservation, nor indeed that such a concern sprouts from a technocratic approach to nature. There are moral 
reasons to be concerned with species and the stress that is put within nature preservation on the preservation of 
biodiversity can be explained as being driven by such moral concerns. Yet, it is our contention that the way in 
which these moral concerns are being articulated and ‘translated’ into preservation practice does not do justices 
to those moral concerns, precisely because the preservation of species is approached in a merely technocratic 
manner. Further on in this paper we show how a non-technocratic approach to biodiversity-preservation might 
look like.  
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routes for future nature restorations. The first one is that of increasing professionalization and 
technification, which he calls the “technological restoration”. The other route is that of “focal 
restoration”, which stresses the creation of “engaged relationships between people and ecosystems” 
(2000: 197). Although these two tendencies do not mutually exclude each other, Higgs points out that 
the technological restoration is gaining popularity among preservationists. 
Higgs’ analysis is based on two important factors. First, advances in technological capabilities 
entail that we are increasingly in control of nature and can thus (re)arrange her to suit our desires and 
purposes. Second, there is a growing acceptance of the idea that whatever we believe nature to be is 
strongly mediated by our personal tastes and our culture. When these two elements combine, the 
danger is that a form of nature restoration arises that will no longer treat nature as something pre-
given which needs to be respected, but that will completely model nature to the needs, desires and 
preferences of humans.  
In this way, nature would become a consumer-good, part of the experience-economy, so 
poignantly described in Tracy Metz’s Fun (2002): no longer acting as a border to whatever we can do 
to it, but appearing as an endlessly malleable hyperreality which can be shaped to fit the ever changing 
desires of the consumer. Nature restorations then become a ‘commodified practice’ in which a careful 
treatment of nature as something that is pre-given and needs to be respected is replaced for a practice 
that strives to develop a certain image and expectation of nature as quickly and efficiently as possible. 
According to Higgs, such a hyperreal nature might indeed give us a richer and more accessible 
experience of nature. Does one want to see red deer? Then why not build a comfortable lookout near 
their rutting ground, neatly worked into the landscape, conveniently near to a car park yet not so near 
as to disturb the illusion that civilization is miles away. Whatever the heart desires, nature provides. 
With the aid of eco-technology, of course. Some have already suggested that nature organizations 
should start charging entrance fees for such experiences.  
 
THE MORAL DRIVE UNDERNEATH RESTORATIONS 
 
Stressing the importance of nature experiences in an attempt to counterbalance the technocratic 
character of restorations has a counter-productive effect. By telling a merely technical story about 
biodiversity supplemented with one about an enriched experience of nature, one raises the suspicion 
that one is out to sell a pre-packaged product rather than be concerned with nature itself.  
Yet it is clear that the preservationists themselves are also driven by a moral view of nature and the 
way we should relate to it, even if hitherto they seemed to lack the vocabulary to articulate it. 
Although the adversaries of the forest clearings reproach them that they want to create a kind of 
surrogate nature, preservationists understand their practice in a different light. Indeed, they believe 
that the respect for nature as a ‘given’ lies at the heart of their practice. Moreover, they believe their 
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whole restoration attempt is precisely inspired and steeped in respect for that pre-givenness (Drenthen 
2009).  
Preservation organizations do not devise their restoration plans ex nihilo, as if they would 
determine how to manage or restore a certain area without any reference to the concrete situation on 
the ground. Every nature restoration, or at least every good nature restoration, starts off from a 
meticulous reading of the landscape in its present state: the soil, the landscape history, the list of 
species present in the area; all are treated as pieces in an archive that tells the story of how the past of 
an area has led to its present state. The task for the preservation organization is then to interpret that 
story and see how one can continue it into the future. Interpreting that story is something else than 
letting one’s fantasy run wild: an interpretation has to account for what it interprets in a satisfactory 
manner. Just like the concrete words in which a text is formulated set definite boundaries to the sorts 
of meaning we can ascribe to a text without necessarily determining the meaning of the text in a 
univocal way and thus leaving room for interpretation, the ‘archive’ of a certain spot can be taken as a 
pre-given reference-point that orientates a restoration attempt in a certain way, without pinning down 
the direction unequivocally.  
Seen in this light, preservationists aren’t busy realizing their own preferences but engaging in 
practices that try to do justice to a specific place, on the basis of a careful reading of such a place. 
Here, the story of the preservation organization shifts from a technical discourse on biodiversity and 
the means to ensure its presence to a moral one about the preservation of the meaning of a certain 
place and how one should relate to it. This opens up the possibility to give a new, richer account of 
certain, sometimes drastic, restoration measures (Deliège 2007): this is not only about certain species 
whose presence needs to be safeguarded through a number of artificial intrusions into the area because 
‘we’ like or value those species, but about preserving species that are a part of the story of a certain 
place, and that therefore quite literally ‘have their place’ there. And who are we to deny them their 
spot?  
The adversaries of the deforestation sometimes claim that in order to preserve those species for 
which one wants to restore heathland, it doesn’t matter much that one restores heath to that specific 
place. Take the smooth snake, a target species for the restoration in the Heiderijk. Smooth snakes are 
not common in the Netherlands, being restricted to a number of heathland and peat-bog reserves. 
Having a population of smooth snakes is thus, seen from a Dutch preservationists viewpoint, 
something to cherish. As a cold-blooded animal, the smooth snake needs open, sunny and sandy spots 
to warm up. This is especially true for pregnant females: they’re ovoviviparous , so pregnant females 
need to bask in the sun to let their eggs ripen. Heathland, peat-bogs or open-spaced forests with large 
clearings form ideal habitat. Clearing dense stands of trees and restoring heathland thus seems like an 
ideal measure to take in favor of the smooth snake. 
Yet, why should we choose the smooth snake over closed canopy forest and its denizens? Does the 
smooth snake’s survival as a species depend on us cutting forests? The smooth snake has a big range 
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that stretches from the Atlantic to the Caspian Sea, comprising most of Europe and a large part of the 
Near East. As a species, it is not threatened with extinction, on the contrary, it is categorized as ‘least 
concern’ by the IUCN. So, what would be so bad about the smooth snake disappearing from the 
Heiderijk, or even from the whole of the Netherlands? There’s plenty of room for it elsewhere.  
If the preservation of the smooth snake as a species was the only justification the preservationists 
could give for the cutting of the forest, they would have little defense against such an argument. For 
the smooth snake as a species, it makes little difference whether it loses some habitat in the Heiderijk 
or not. But if you include the smooth snake in the larger story of the history of the forests to the south 
of Nijmegen and how these forests once formed an unbroken stretch of heathland, their disappearance 
might appear in a different light. The loss of the smooth snake then constitutes a loss of meaning for a 
particular place. Without the smooth snake, the place’s story is simply incomplete, as if some words 
are missing from a poem; suddenly there is a loss of meaning, a gap in the archives (Drenthen 2009). 
What is lost is a layer of meaning from a certain area, a loss of an inspiring story that could be told 
about a certain area. Seen in this way, it is not about our preference for this or that story, but about the 
potential of an area to be evocative out of its own accord, about recognizing, or failing to recognize, 
what has made a certain area to what it is. 
By refocusing the discussion from a technical discourse on the preservation of species to one that 
stresses the specific meaning of a place, one can also avoid the sterile, empirical discussion about the 
naturalness of the heath or the forest. For the protesters, forest is real nature: that’s what’s there at the 
moment and will develop itself further if given the chance. Moreover, before heathlands were created 
through agricultural practices, most of them would probably have been forests. The forest does not 
need any help from humans to maintain itself, in contrast to heathland, which needs continuous human 
management. Yet those protestors seem to pay too little attention to the fact that the forests we find in 
the Heiderijk and Averbode are young forests, planted with a very specific goal in mind: to provide 
wood for the mining industries. Those forests are far from ‘natural’: the monotonous species 
composition is unlike any ‘natural forest’ and the trees are densely packed to ensure a rapid and 
straight ‘matchstick-like’ growth. Such forests do not durably sustain themselves, they need to be 
managed too; indeed they were designed to be managed. It is impossible to claim that these forests 
resemble anything like the ‘original forest’ that might have stood here centuries and maybe even 
millennia ago: that forest has truly been lost.  
When one stresses the meaning of a certain place, a call to return to the ‘truly original’ landscape 
might even be a result of a lack of respect for the pre-givenness of a certain place. A story about the 
forests south of Nijmegen in the Heiderijk that does not thematize the fact that they were cleared to 
make room for heathland during many centuries and possibly even millennia is an inauthentic story 
that misrepresents the particularity, the pre-givenness, of that place. A story that negates the forests 
and only talks about heath is of course an inauthentic story for the very same reasons. 
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The point is that the main question is not whether this or that particular type of landscape is 
authentically natural or not. Both the forest and the heath are as natural or artificial as each other, if 
‘natural’ here stands for ‘relatively free of human interference’. We therefore do not need to expect 
any satisfactory outcome of such a debate. Yet, the authenticity of a given area is not solely 
determined by the question whether it is authentically natural or not. The fact that both forests and 
heath are ‘humanly mediated landscapes’ does not make them inauthentic landscapes. The question 
about the authenticity of a certain place deals with the question whether or not a place can manifest 
itself to us as conveying meaning (Deliège 2007, 2010). In such a framework, nature preservation is 
all about the question of how one can let the meaning of a particular natural area continue to resonate, 
how one can enable it to tell its story itself. It might be possible that in order to achieve that, humans 
need to interfere with the area, yet this does not mean that humans can simply and arbitrarily decide 
on what will happen: every good attempt at nature restoration, just as every form of good nature 
preservation, starts off from the insight that there is a certain pre-givenness that needs to be respected, 
and that clearly defines the borders of what is suitable and desirable.  
 
FOCAL RESTORATIONS 
 
By shifting the attention to the meanings an area incorporates, we avoid both too much 
subjectification and too much objectification of nature preservation practices. Moral meanings do not 
exist in objective nature but neither are they merely subjective experiences: they testify of the way we 
are always already engaged in the world. Nature restorations have to pay careful consideration to the 
way in which nature has always mattered to us, how particular places are always already enmeshed in 
the stories we tell about ourselves and our communities. These stories are not mere subjective 
projections: particular places are always already ‘wrapped up’ in stories that transcend our, and even 
humanity’s time-frame. The story of a particular place is for instance not only about the history of its 
cultivation (as is the case when one talks about heathland), but also about the deep-geological time 
that explains why a certain soil is there which was conductive to heathland-farming in the first place. 
Yet those stories cannot simply be objectively gleaned from the landscape either, as if in retrieving 
these stories we were just ascertaining facts about the landscape. The point is that one needs to 
inscribe oneself in the landscape, take up an active position within the meaning of the landscape in 
order to let it reverberate. One has to position oneself against and within the landscape in an attempt to 
testify of the always already existing relation between humans and that particular natural place.  
According to Higgs, that is what focal restorations are all about: the creation of engaged 
relationships between people and ecosystems that present the commanding presence of nature. Such 
an approach not only demands ecological measures, but also cultural ones: rituals, community 
building, nature education and so on. It also presupposes that we see the relation locals have with 
‘their forest’ as more than merely consumptive: the attachment they feel to a certain area, and the 
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concern they feel for the area from that attachment, is not only an interest in having pleasurable nature 
experiences, but a concern for a nature that is ‘just there’ and therefore deserves protection.  
 
CONFLICTING STORIES, MORAL CHOICES 
 
The idea that we can make or simulate nature will eventually cave in on itself and make it impossible 
to address the deeper moral issues at play in nature restorations. The choice to preserve nature is not a 
technical, but a moral choice. Moral meanings exist because of the meaningful stories we tell about 
this world. One of the most powerful and deeply entrenched moral meanings in the Western European 
culture is that nature has a deep moral meaning precisely because it transcends our limited human 
perspective. A justification of nature preservation therefore demands stories that show how we can 
relativize our own importance, transcend our all-too-human desires, and how to make a meaningful 
connection between our human society and the wider nature on which it rests. 
Of course, this will not solve every possible conflict. As always with the interpretation of stories or 
works of art, there can be big, even unbridgeable differences between interpretations. The meaning of 
both forest and heath is tied up in important ways to the fact that they are, in an important sense, ‘gifts 
of time’. While for the preservationists, that time includes the period in which the Heiderijk and 
Averbode were heathland; it does not for the protesters. The preservationists either implicitly or 
explicitly refer back to the centuries in which the heath dominated. Many present locals lack such 
associations with deep time. The heath has been gone too long in order leave markers that would be 
obvious to untrained eyes.  
Such conflicts are often interwoven with different readings of the landscape, readings that interpret 
landscapes in terms of involvement, co-operation or even co-creation of humans and land, or rather as 
a scission between humans and nature. Are heathlands the result of centuries of over-exploitation, or 
the result of traditional farming techniques that opened up space for other organisms as well? Are the 
recent forest neglected wood-plantations, or the result of a policy that allows the forest to develop by 
itself? It will therefore be difficult to find measures that both restore heath and treat the forest 
respectfully. When heath restorations not only deal with the recovery of heathland species, but also 
with amending the broken relationship between humans and the land, it is relevant to know whether a 
forest has been chopped down by a bulldozer or by a storm. From a technical viewpoint, both events 
might set the same ecological processes in motion, and both events might therefore be seen as 
identical. But of course, in the one case humans decide, in the other humans undergo nature. It is 
possible that waiting and doing nothing is no good option, but in such a case the preservationists 
should start with the recognition that there is a tension between the moral goal and the technical 
means to achieve it.  
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STORIED RESIDENCE AS CENTRAL TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN  
 
Preservationists should not only be concerned with ‘nature itself’, but also with the people who are 
concerned with nature. This does not have to mean that human desires must always be central. Studies 
show that a great number of Dutch at least value the existence of other species, even when they are of 
no use to humans and not even only when they are directly enjoyable to us (De Groot et.al. 2011). 
Even the desire to preserve nature for itself is in the end a reflection of human values that are shared 
and recognized by us. As such, you could call this a human desire, but then you transform it: people 
do not necessarily want to see their own desires satisfied, they want nature to do well.  
Yet the desire does engage our total human being: for he who holds such a wish, there is no 
difference between human desire and the interests of nature, only between a short-term self-interest 
and a broader scope that holds that human life has meaning precisely through being situated in a larger 
natural context. When people say they are concerned about the future existence of species, this is not 
only the result of the belief that those species are useful or the source of pleasant experiences, but 
because they feel connected to that which transcends their own self-interest: nature as a force that 
carries us, as a place where other living creatures also reside, creatures that sometimes need protection 
against our short-term interests and desires. 
When people decide to care for nature together they do so from a social and ethical context in 
which stories play a key role: stories that situate them within the greater story of the environment, 
stories that allow them to take up a 'storied residence' in the environment. It is through these stories 
that we tell each other why and how nature matters. The irony is that nearly every preservationist has 
such a story to tell: a story about love, admiration, wonder and connectedness, a desire to work 
towards a world in which humans and nature can go together.  
 
CONCLUSION: ENVIRONMENTAL HERMENEUTICS AS A MODEL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS IN 
PRACTICE 
 
In this paper we have argued that hermeneutics can provide a fruitful perspective on conflicts of 
interpretation about the specific meanings of storied residence. We have tried to demonstrate how 
environmental hermeneutics can help explicate the interpretational base of our being-in-the-world by 
articulating those pre-existing meanings and interpretations that already play a role in how we act and 
think, and in doing so force us to have a second look at them. Some of our previous interpretations of 
the land may prove to be inadequate or outdated once we properly reflect upon them. A hermeneutical 
environmental ethics will ask in what sense these old interpretations can still be considered adequate 
articulations of how the world we find ourselves in beckons to be understood, or whether we should 
seek new articulations. Rearticulating these meanings can be laborious, but plays a critical part. 
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The task of a hermeneutical environmental ethics, then, is to articulate and make explicit those 
interpretations and meanings that are already at work in our everyday practices, to bring them to light 
and make them explicit, and to confront existing meanings and interpretations with other, less obvious 
interpretations. Doing so will increase our sensitivity for the many different meanings that can be at 
stake in our dealings with a particular place, although it will also make the questions of ethics even 
more complex than they already are. However, by showing how our understanding of ourselves is 
already emplaced, a hermeneutical environmental ethics can help us to better understand what is at 
stake in our complex relation with the landscape. 
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